Power, Propaganda, and a Reshaped Middle East

Hello, everyone, and thank you for joining us on the Fairfax Files. Today's guest is a woman who has spent her career decoding the world's most complicated conflicts for the rest of us. She spent 12 years in senior US government roles under both Bush and Obama administrations, serving in top communications and policy posts at the Treasury Department and at the White House. Today she's an adjunct professor at Columbia University's School of Public Affairs, the co-founder of the newly launched Lebanon Israeli Peace Alliance, and the host of both the Threat podcast and the hit YouTube channel Oh My World, where she breaks down global chaos with wit and clarity. Please welcome national security and foreign policy expert Hagar Chemali. Hagar, thank you so much for being with us today. I really love your YouTube show. I think it's kind of spicy and, and really to the point. I enjoy watching it. So congratulations.

Oh, Michael, that means a lot. That means the world. Thank you so much. I enjoy it. If it looks like I enjoy what I do. And in trying to make people laugh, it's. I really do enjoy every minute it comes through.

You got that? Just the right balance of humor and, and objectivity. And of course, you talk about very important subjects. Speaking about important subjects. President Trump, of course, is at the NATO meeting and has been there for a couple days, and he announced the end of the ceasefire with Iran. And was there actually ever a ceasefire?

I know, I was so surprised at the end of this quote, unquote, ceasefire, possibly the most predictable thing that could have happened this year. No, it was kind of a less fire is how I like to describe it. But that's not uncommon for that region or for many wars, is where you have a ceasefire that is still violent in some way. So not totally surprising.

I tell you what is uncommon. Now, I did spend some time in government in Washington, including at the State Department. At State Department, you know, we kind of negotiated treaties and. But I never heard the term memorandum of understanding at the State Department. It's a very common term in business. But who ever heard of executing a memorandum of understanding with another country about what you're likely to do in the future?

Yeah, it's a little, you know, it's why I don't love when people ask me to compare the MOU to the Obama deal, because I'm like, well, it wasn't a deal. It was just this MOU. And, you know, when I was at the Treasury Department, we had MOUs with other countries, but these were. Or with other institutes or alliances or banks even, but these were not Public documents that were viewed as some kind of massive agreement or deal per se, whereas this was. So you're right, it's not a common term used in the state, these geopolitical events. But, you know, that's.

Well, I suspect that President Trump, having been a businessman and some people think he's still a businessman, is probably used to dealing in those terms like memorandum of understanding. It might have been his idea, I don't know. But, you know, I was looking at the funeral recently that was held for Khomeini and the millions and millions of people that turned up in, in the streets at the funeral. And the verbiage, the language, the hate against America and Americans. And in your judgment, are we really ever going to have a lasting peace with Iran?

Not so long as the regime is there. And by the way, not just the United States, but the whole region won't have peace as long as the Iranian regime remains in power. That doesn't necessarily mean I don't have hope for Iran and for the region in the future. We can't forget that this regime is bankrupt. It has no military, it has no navy, it has no nuclear program, which was part of the thing propping it up. It has no defense missile capabilities. So we own their skies. And the majority of the population of 90 million people despise the regime and want to see it go. So the fact they're banking on the fact that they're strong because they survived this war from the United States and Israel, and I don't mean to dismiss that, that is an important point. But at the same time, all the levers that give a government, any government, power and strength, they don't. Not the economy, not the military, nothing. Not the public support. So I don't think the regime will last forever. And when that happens, things could be unstable. But in the long run, I do think that we could see peace. But the regime has to go.

Well, many, many years ago. And I now go back to the late 1990s, we had a problem with that regime and it was overthrown. Not a similar problem. That was a problem of very brutal dictatorship, obviously. And there's some similarities between that regime and this lack of respect for human rights. But that didn't turn out too well for us, that replacement of that form of regime. What makes us think that it'll be any better if we replace this current regime?

No, you know, it's an interesting question because it's never going to be perfect. It can't be black or white. I can tell you from my time having worked in counterterrorism in the US Government handling the Middle East, that the majority of our threats stem from threats emanating from the Iranian regime. So if it's not the regime itself, it's all of the proxies, militias and terrorist groups they fund in the region and their operations that are global, by the way, including in the United States. You have IRGC elements, you have Hezbollah cells, you have in Europe, you have a lot of it, Southeast Asia. So that's really. Those are really global threats that the majority of US resources are focused on tackling. And I always say that to people so that they understand the type of threat this regime poses. So I don't want to imply, and I don't think anybody should imply that we're better off with them there versus the instability that we could see with a collapse of the regime because it's just not black or white. It's really weighing costs and benefits. Now you can see the Trump administration trying to rewrite this playbook of regime change. They are trying to do it in Venezuela. It remains to be seen if the mile they've used in Venezuela does work. This idea where you take out the leader somehow, in that case abducted. Maduro was abducted, you take him out, you find somebody you can work with, you keep the elements there so that it's unlike Iraq, you keep the elements there and you find ways to incentivize those elements or leaders to work with the United States to, to start putting in place democratic norms or practices, working toward free and fair elections or releasing political prisoners or so on. And we don't know yet how that's going to work out in Venezuela. But you can see that the Trump administration is viewing that as an ideal model. It might work and history might look back and say, oh, that is a good way to do regime change. But I don't see that being possible in Iran because you're dealing with extremists who are fanatic.

Well, let me ask you about that because you talk about it as a threat from Iran, but isn't the threat greater than that? There's a threat from the radical Islamists who are anti-West against our culture, against our way of life, and are opportunists, whether it's from Iran or elsewhere. So how do we confront the greater threat?

Yeah, yeah, I'm glad you mentioned this because I like that you looked at it at the 60,000-foot level because it's important too. And we're seeing those threats play out in the United States in particular. So like you Said you have the Iranian regime, but behind that really it is Islamism, extremism and pushing this very anti-West and by the way, very anti-oppressor. That's what is at the core of this, is this anti view of the oppressor. We have to fight the oppressor, we have to fight the elite. And Islam is the way to do it. And you see the Iranian regime trying to spread that ideology and fund elements of it everywhere around the world, including in the United States. You had protesters and agitators in the so called pro-Palestinian protests who were funded by the IRGC, some of whom knew, some of whom didn't. But the fact is that the Iranian regime, why are they doing that? It's because it serves their interest. If they can get young individuals, in particular youth who are lost, who don't know this region, who don't understand Islamism, who are also very worried about being politically correct. So they're afraid to perhaps point things out that are Islamist, how that differs from Islam in general. They are working with a group of individuals who are vulnerable to that kind of exploitation and it ends up spreading like wildfire. And you're seeing it, like I said, not just the protests funded by these foreign elements in the United States, you're seeing it in Europe. Right after the Iran war started, the Iranian regime moved very quickly to establish a terrorist group called Hayi that no one is talking about. It's in Europe and they find young criminals and they pay them 500 to €1,000 or pounds to go carry out arson attacks or stabbings, stabbings of Jews, arson attacks near synagogues. And it's this way of spreading these views, spreading this culture and this ideology. And you're right, it is a major threat to the United States, but also democracy and our values and freedoms generally.

You know, we haven't had much that is the United States in common with Iran, but one thing we did have in common, we were both enemies of ISIS. How did we find ourselves on the same page with.

In that. How did we find ourselves on the same page on that, on ISIS, on ISIS, with Iran? For the United States, it's more a general stand against terrorist groups and Islamist extremist groups. And ISIS in particular was one of the worst ones and one of the most threatening for a number of reasons. But for the Iranian regime, the Iranian regime, these are extremist ideological fanatics who are Shia and ISIS is Sunni. So the Shia and Sunni also have their own fight going on in the region. Now, that doesn't necessarily mean that we partnered with the Iranian regime in any way, shape or form against ISIS. We partnered with 60 other states. When we pursued the efforts, effort against ISIS, it took four years. That's when they controlled land between Iraq and Syria the size of the United Kingdom. And after four years between those 60 partners and the Kurds on the ground, we successfully defeated them and took control over that land. Again, not us, sorry, but gave control back away from ISIS to Syria and Iraq. But the Iranian regime also felt, of course, that it was against ISIS, because ISIS and elements that are Sunni extremists also seek to work against the Iranian regime because of that Shia-Sunni fight. And that is rooted in Islamic history. By the way. It goes very far back.

Barring regime change in Iran, what would you think is the best outcome not only for the United States, but for the other countries like Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar?

Yeah. You know, what's interesting is I feel like we're seeing a reshaping of the Middle East, particularly since October 7th. And that reshaping, to me, I think, is it's building the way it will look in the future that benefits most of the countries in the region and the United States. And what I mean is that you're seeing on one hand, October 7, aside from being a horrific terrorist attack, strategically, was the biggest mistake Iran and Hamas could ever make. Because after October 7, you saw what led to the. The almost entire defeat of Hamas. You see Iran in the state that it's in, no defense, missile capabilities, no military, no navy, as I said, bankrupt, and so on. Hezbollah also in Lebanon, significantly degraded. So you're seeing all of these bad elements, and I often say this, that it's kind of a fight between good and evil. So all these evil elements, the quote, unquote, axis of resistance on its back foot, on its heels as the weaker ones. And now you're seeing not only those who were part of the Abraham Accords, but new countries who want. Who are exploring peace with Israel because they know that it means stability and prosperity for their countries. So Lebanon and Syria, by the way, and they're not the only ones, even Saudi Arabia, that goes out and says, well, not now. And, you know, we want to make sure that the Palestinians are on their way to statehood before we normalize relations with Israel even they're interested in it and they know they need it for the diversification of their economy. So all these countries are prioritizing rightfully so stability and prosperity. And they know they're not going to get it unless they make peace with Israel. And because that undermines the elements of extremism in their country and it's generally pro West. And so I see that trend moving. Maybe I'm optimistic, but I see that trend moving in general in the Middle East. And I also think that you might have after this war a security agreement or alliance, if you will, something like NATO of the Middle East. And that would be very interesting.

So if you ask folks from Hamas today or Iran, which funds Hamas, whether if they had to do it over again, they would repeat October 7th, I suspect they would say yes. And you'd ask them why, and they'll say, well, in the long run, it's benefiting us because the world is starting to turn against Israel.

I bet they do see it that way and you do see that element. But because I happen to work on Lebanon, Israel, peace, and we're going to talk about that. Yes, well. And so I happen to have a very unique perspective. And I do. And listen, as I said, I am very concerned about this rise in extremism. And as you said, it's an anti it's not just a hatred for Israel. It is also a hatred for the United States, including from Americans. And I agree with you that the regime is probably sitting back and Hamas and Hezbollah sitting back watching young Americans, Europeans waving their terrorist flags saying, you know, we hate Israel. You even have groups in the United States, one of which pursues violence on behalf of this cause as well. And I bet they are watching that and thinking to them, patting themselves on the back thinking, you know, now we've unleashed all of these individuals who hate Israel. The reason I think that they're deluded and that I'm not surprised they think that I do agree with you, but I believe they're deluded. And the reason for that is because with all those odds, you are still seeing efforts to pursue peace with Israel, to expand NATO, to fight domestic terrorism. You're seeing those efforts grow. And because history also proves that when you have times like this, when those sentiments grow, and we've seen it before in the 1980s, there was a huge time in Europe where sentiments of that kind, pro-Palestinian, anti Israeli, grew and it dissipated because it's again, it's kind of a fight between good and evil. And at the end of the day, those good elements, they have to wake up, but they do wake up. You're seeing universities now trying to figure out a way to suppress those extremist elements, teach civil dialogue, highlight ideas and conversation from all sides so that it doesn't end up feeding one extremist view or one view that leans one way politically more than the other. And so you are seeing those elements. That's why I have hope and optimism for it. If I didn't, I wouldn't be able to get up out of bed every morning. But I just, I think that history proves that those guys never win.

You have a good bit of Washington in your DNA, having worked there for many years. And of course, we know about the strong political support that Israel has had in Washington for many, many years, a lot of it, of course, being funded by AIPAC. And I'm not against lobbyists, never have been, never will be, as long as they operate legally. But do you think that now there are other countries outside the United States that are lobbying more effectively in Washington against Israeli interests?

Yes. The short answer is yes. And I would note, and this is something that's not well understood, it seems among the more popular view in the United States, but there are a lot of countries that spend way more on lobbying in, in Washington than Israel does. Countries like Qatar in particular. Qatar and Qatar is, first of all, they've, they've done it the most successfully compared to Israel, and compared to most countries, Qatar, the UAE, Turkey, Azerbaijan, these countries spend a lot of money. I don't know where Israel ranks. I know that they're certainly not in the top two. And, and Qatar is way up there, then the UAE. So, so they spend a lot. They do it very. And they do it very well. And a lot of it does have to do with the amount of money that's spent, but a lot of it is also the strategy they deploy. So it's not just that they are paying lobbyists to push for certain policies in Washington, which is kind of the classic way that lobbying works. But they're also, they have their hands buying up media companies, buying up pundits, buying up powerful individuals, whether it's through actual payment, whether it's by gifting them certain things, whether it's by sponsoring different kinds of events, conferences, and it's not that it's not public. It is public, it has to be legally. But the end user doesn't really pay attention to what it means when they go to an event sponsored by Qatar and all of the panelists might lean in a certain direction.

I actually visited, for business purposes, Gaza about six years ago, and I was, I came away with, with several different thoughts. One, the control of Hamas was overwhelming and had been for 40 years. They ran everything and very authoritarian nature. The poverty level struck me and I spoke to a lot of Young Palestinians at that time about what their hopes for their future were. Many of them well educated. There was very few job opportunities in Gaza, so they would stay in school and get Master's degrees and PhDs because they couldn't find jobs. All they wanted was a job in security. They would love to go to Israel and work in Israel where the jobs. Then I wound up a few years after that, living for two years in. In Qatar, in Doha. And I would go to some very fancy restaurants, and I would see the leaders of Hamas at a table drinking expensive champagne, ordering the most expensive meals. And I'm thinking to myself, they have people that are suffering from poverty in Gaza, and here they're living like kings. How does that happen?

Yeah, it's so typical of them, too, right? And on top of it, they will say publicly they've been asked by journalists in the region, how can you be so comfortable with yourself living in the lap of luxury in Doha while your people are starving or literally being killed? This was in particular during the two years of the war in Gaza. And they said, I mean, they don't hide this. They say, well, this is. Part of. This is important. The martyrdom is important. The death of the people is what allows us to achieve our goal. It is a necessary piece. So they don't even hide that. They view. They have certainly no regard for human life, but they also view the Palestinians and Gazans, humans and their followers and supporters, or not supporters or followers, as just chips, weapons in war and weapons in informational war as well, by the way, in information warfare. And they knew exactly what they were doing with October 7th. We all know how Israel responds to terrorist attacks. It's part of their playbook. They have a playbook about this, about a very exceptionally different brutal response. We all expected this after October 7th. They did, too. They knew what they were doing. They knew that they would be inviting the destruction and death that they did. And they're fine with it, A. Because they're comfortable sitting over there. It's like, that's why people say it's a death cult.

A lot of people say they did what they did at that time, October 7, because of the improving relationships between Israel and some of their neighbors, like Saudi Arabia and.

That's right. So, you know, it's so interesting you bring that up, because I remember at the beginning, I was not sure before we knew, and you are right, that that is what they had discovered when they got the laptop of Yahya Sinwar, one of the top Hamas leaders, who's now thankfully in a grave somewhere. They found that the discussions between Israel and Saudi Arabia being brokered by the Biden administration at that time really did serve as a motivating factor for October 7th, because this feeling was if the whole region moves out ahead and forgets the Palestinian cause, then what ability are they going to have to move that needle forward? And I want to be very clear, Hamas is not interested in a Palestinian state. They're interested in Islam, in an Islamic caliphate that would be, that would take the place of the land that you have today of Israel, the West Bank and Gaza, and that it would be an Islamic caliphate under a very republic, authoritarian, repressive and extremist rule. It's not actually about a Palestinian state, and that's very clear in their charter. But they did fear that those talks, that movement toward peace, toward normalization with Saudi Arabia on top of it, which is really or was at least the hegemon of the Middle East, that that would really undermine their efforts. But still, I believe, and this is why I say it's often a fight between good and evil. And I know that sounds so simplistic, but it is. And sometimes it feels like these evil players and terrorist groups and criminal are winning, but in the long run, they don't. And you see that now. You're seeing that now, you know, two and a half years later with efforts across the board to work with Israel to expand the Abraham Accords, to pursue peace deals. And that's why I maintain such optimism in it.

I know that you're of Lebanese heritage and I also know that you recently founded a new organization, Lebanon Israeli Peace Alliance. Tell us about that. What's your thoughts behind this?

Sure. Thank you for asking about it. So Lebanon, Israel peace was not something that was at the forefront of a lot of people's minds until January of last year of 2025. And the reason for that is up until the fall of 2024, the grip that Hezbollah had on Lebanon was really strong. And Hezbollah responds to one boss, and that boss is sitting in Tehran. It is not fundamentally a Lebanese organization organization. It was established and created by the Iranian regime shortly after the regime took over Iran in 1979. So we know who they're, who they from whom they take orders. But they had this massive grip on the country. They had influence across the government, positions across the government. They had prevented the country from having a president for two years. That was not the only time they had done that, that. But reach fall of 2024, and there's an escalation between Israel And Hezbollah. Israel decapitates Hezbollah. You had this famous pager explosions that really humiliated the. The organization because they realized how penetrated they were by the Israelis as well. So at the end of that, that's November 2024. They're not defeated, but they're significantly degraded. A few weeks later, Bashar al-Assad of Syria falls completely unexpectedly. No foreign policy person could have expected that. And so suddenly you had the two boots stepping on Lebanon's neck gone. And then by January 2025, the Lebanese hold elections from which they couldn't. They couldn't hold them under the influence of Hezbollah. They hold elections and they elect a president who comes out and says that all arms will be under the monopoly of the state. And that's when a few. It was a small group of people, and we each found each other a small group of people, some of whom are think tankers, some of whom are kind of political operators, some are academics or just activists. Each of us saw this opportunity for peace and we started working on it. And so eventually a few of us ended up launching the Lebanon Israel Peace Alliance, which is a 501(c)(4). So it's a lobbying organization where we advocate for policies that support a Lebanon Israel peace agreement. And we try to advance a vision where Lebanon joins the Abraham Accords and where there are peace elements and projects that support a sustainable peace.

How long will it take for the civilian government of Lebanon to be able to have a strong enough military and police presence to assure that Hezbollah won't rear its ugly head again?

This is probably the crux of the issue. So you really hit the nail on the head. I can't really place a time frame on it, but the Lebanese government is very aware that time is not on their side, and the military too. That time's not on their side because the Iranian regime has its eyes on Lebanon. We saw that when things right after the MOU, the first iteration of this MOU from the Trump administration and the Iranian regime was signed. The first thing the regime said was actually it needs to include Lebanon and it needs to include a ceasefire and the Israelis need to withdraw. Why? Because that would benefit Hezbollah. It would allow them to rebuild, rearm and restrategize, and you have no end of the conflict so long as that remains the case for Hezbollah. So that pressure, by the way, is what allowed those two sides to reach a what was called a trilateral framework agreement a few weeks ago at the end of June. It's the first signed agreement between Lebanon and Israel in over 40 years. So I cannot overstate the importance of that agreement. It is still only one step in the element, in the effort to get to peace. But a big piece of that is disarmament of Hezbollah. And how are you going to have that? You need a military, as you're pointing out, that is strong, that is capable, and that's willing. And so. So it's going to be a little bit of a push and pull. And you're going to see that as Hezbollah continues to be proven as weak and as assessments come out on how weak they are, and the more they are losing popular support in Lebanon, the more the military can flex its muscles, and the more it flexes its muscles, the more support and aid they're going to get from the United States. So it has to be all the parts have to move at the same time where Israel continues to degrade Hezbollah, the Lebanese military continues to prove that for the areas where it's going to take control now that they have the capability and willingness and where the United States sees that and they can invest in them further. So all of it has to happen at the same time. The thing I always say is like, it's like puzzle pieces that kind of have to inch together and all move at the same time until it finally works. But it's going to take at least a year or two.

You mentioned earlier the possibility of the vision of a Middle Eastern NATO alliance, but the direction we're headed today, it seems to me that traditional alliances are moot. Where are we going?

But are they moot? Because you know what? Sometimes it feels that way. And I understand that. I understand that in the olden times, ten years ago, the olden times when I was in government, we wouldn't, wouldn't have pursued a war without telling our European allies in particular. Even if they didn't join us, you still want them to at least be aware, because it's going to affect them somehow. And there's if there's any war that proved that wars have global effects for everybody, it was this one. And so you. I see your point that it doesn't feel as though there's an emphasis on alliances. And you know what? There isn't. I'm not trying to pretend there is from the Trump administration. They don't seem to value alliances the way previous administrations have. Except at the same time, the first thing that Trump lamented about after the war was, why isn't Europe helping me? Why aren't they getting into the Strait of Hormuz and getting themselves involved? They still make sure to be at every G7, G20 NATO meeting. The fact that the European countries have increased their defense spending, each of them within NATO, that is really a win that can be attributed to Trump. He's the one who pressured those countries and said, the US Is not going to be there for you. So, not that I like that, by the way. I think that that's never a good statement from the US President. However, he ended up placing this pressure and we needed those European countries to increase their defense.

No question about it.

Yes, Obama felt the same way.

He was entirely right about that approach. Now, you know, you spent some time, obviously at the United Nations, and I think that the President has probably less respect for the United Nations, a lot less respect for the United Nations than he does for NATO.

Yeah, for sure.

And the United Nations seems to be right now in a period of time, particularly from a financial standpoint. What do we need to do to reform the United Nations to make it a more effective organization in the eyes of the American people?

So I love that you brought this up because people always assume that because I was spokesperson at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations that I'm going to tout the UN as this amazing institution and glory. I believe in the United Nations. I also believe it needs to be burnt to. Burned to the ground and rebuilt. And it is because it has become completely feckless in achieving its mission. And it is now, as you said, facing a real. It's not just a crISIS, it's an existential crISIS as to whether it is needed in this world because it has been unable to prevent massive conflict or efforts by dictators and authoritarians to lop off a piece of their neighbor's land like Russia did to Ukraine. It's unable then to. If it can't achieve its mission, then what is it doing taking up valuable real estate in New York City? John Bolton used to say in his book, he said that if you shaved off the top 12 floors of the United Nations Secretariat building in New York, it would be exactly the same. And having worked at the UN twice, by the way, he's completely right. It's a lot of reports. It's a lot of elbow rubbing and hobnobbing and drinking and diplomats and talking and also antisemitic banter, by the way. And of course you're gonna have everybody feel as though it is not a necessary institution. And that is wrong because we need the international world order after World War II proved that we need fora, like the UN, like NATO, these institutions that by Having either relations that are close with other countries or in the case of the un, at least a place for issues to be hashed out diplomatically. You need those, all of those different institutions to prevent another world war. The issue with the UN in order to make it viable is that over time what happened is that you had nefarious actors, dictators, authoritarian governments and so on that started using their place at the UN to advance their agenda or to whitewash their crimes. That's why the UN Human Rights Council is completely full of the worst human rights abusers around the world. China, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Cuba. I could go on. And so if in order to make the UN and I believe that we should, by the way, I'm extra harsh on the UN because I believe we need needs to have a system where if you, the country cannot abide by its most basic elements in its charter, then you're not allowed to be a member. And by the way, all those countries I just mentioned, and including for example, Russia, they are in violation of the UN Charter. And yet the only way a member can be kicked out of the UN is if the Security Council says so. But Russia and China are not going to allow that to happen. So its inherent system is flawed and it just needs to be updated. And I'm not trying to say I have the perfect answer. Academics for literally 30 years have been trying to figure this out, but they do need to figure out something where you have a system that doesn't allow, where maybe you have an independent board that isn't made up of. It's. I know it's hard because everybody is inherently from a certain country, but you do have, it does exist, where you have institutions made up of people who are objective, who are tested for that objectivity, who are the ones who decide, who say, you know, you are in violation of the UN Charter, you can't be a member.

Well, it's not only the objectivity. The UN is known as the greatest bureaucracy on earth. Do we need to bring in Elon Musk?

I don't know about that because. And because then they just might doge the whole thing. And then you just have a feckless organization with less resources. And I'm just not sure that even that helps at all because then you have nothing. I will say, for example, the elements of the UN that are helpful and successful are a lot of the organizations out in the field, organizations like the World Food Program and UNICEF. There are a lot that do really good work. So there is this need for it. But if really what The UN should be because the goal of the UN is really to maintain international peace and security and to prevent conflict. I can't tell you how many times I've made fun of the Secretary General, Antonio Guterres, who two years ago when we had the greatest number and he went and said this at the U.S. he's outgoing. Yeah, thank God. Yes, he's outgoing. This year as his last year and he.

Have you applied for, for the job yet?

I'm thinking about it. Do you think. Would you vote for me? Do you think the US should nominate?

I want to switch just for a second because we don't have much time left and it's a very important topic I want to bring up because for some years now you've been an adjunct professor at Columbia University, which means you get face time with Generation Z and Generation Z are a little difficult to understand. I've read some statistics lately. 38% of Generation Z don't believe that patriotism is important. 26% believe that political violence is appropriate to create change. What are you getting feedback wise from your students?

Yeah. So I will say my students are amazing. And it might also be sometimes I'll see a little bit of it. But I teach grad school and grad students are really much more. Their level of intellect is higher and their openness to different ideas is also higher. So when, so when I teach, it's, you know, I have not faced this kind of these kinds of extreme views in my mind. Sometimes you will see, you know, especially when you have like a university like Columbia University, where the view is, if it's not left, it's right, wrong. And I am fiercely nonpartisan and fiercely unaffiliated and independent as well. So in my own class, I will teach, I'll say, well, you know, I'll poke holes in an argument or I'll highlight something that was good and bad on the left and on the right. And they are very open to it, actually. But again, these are grad students, so they've already gone through undergrad, they've gone through, through working. And I think working has a big piece of it too. When you are accountable to a boss or you're accountable to a company, you cannot say what you want publicly without some kind of ramification. They understand that social contract a bit better, but they're also just generally more mature. So, so they're very open to these conversations. And I really, I, I have, I've loved my experience teaching. I find it extremely rewarding for that reason. But you're seeing it is in some grad school level as well. So I don't want to stereotype that they're all open or mature. You're seeing that across the country there is this view that is being pushed that the United States is the enemy, that we're the problem, we're the enemy. Not just the U.S. I mean, not just the U.S. government. Their view is not just the U.S. government, that we, the American people, that our American values are the problem, that we deserved. That's why you hear comments like we deserved 9/11 because we were friends with Israel, for example. It's a fundamentally wrong way of thinking. And that stems from education, the lack of proper education at a younger age, not teaching American history the right way, not teaching American values the right way. And I often say that, that immigrants or children of immigrants and I'm a child of Lebanese parents. This country that gave my parents so much opportunity and me as well, obviously. My parents told me every day how lucky I was to be born here and how lucky I was to be American, that this is the best country in the world. They say it still, I say it still. And that's a unique view, but it, and it's not just immigrant. I do think it's generational as well. Those who understood the Cold War, who Understood World War II, those of us who were taught by teachers who experienced those eras. And that's just not how it is now. And we have to go back to that. I don't, I don't, I mean, I don't know enough to know if there is, if that's sweeping the educational system. I do know that I can tell you from at Columbia, there is a view of we have to ensure that we teach those values. We have to ensure that we teach civil discourse because it wasn't. We have to ensure that why are these kids being antisemitic, for example? Why is there inherent antisemitism? So therefore people don't understand what antisemitism and why it's important to fight against it. So all of this is an effort to go backwards a bit and understand those values and principles and our founding principles. Poetic, since it's the 250th birthday, but it's going to be a long way.

I appreciate your objectivity and your nonpartisanship. And I'll ask you this final question. You worked in both the Bush and Obama administrations. What did you find the difference between those two administrations for?

Oh, that's a great question. There are a lot. So it is a point of pride for me that I worked for both Bush and Obama. I would love to go back to government one day. In general, I always say that I'm a student of Dennis Ross, where he advised different leaders of different parties at a very high level also because of his expertise. So I hope that we get back to that. We're in a phase right now where each side is really demanding a lot, you know, certain set of loyalty. The difference is. So first, I will tell you in just on the surface level, because it's a bit gossipy and I think it's fun, is that Republicans are a bit better at work-life balance, by the way. They're a bit better at work-life balance. They're a bit more, they joke a bit more in the office. I don't know why there is that sentiment. Under Democrats, there was a lot more churn, a lot more micromanaging, a lot more busy work, a lot more bureaucracy also. Whereas under Republicans, things were a bit more flat. You know, you could easily go to the secretary and pitch an idea. And they knew that the best way to make that happen would be to kind of cut through the red tape. And so anyway, so you saw that. But there are pros and cons to each of that, by the way, because Democrats also end up, because of that churn and that bureaucracy, they end up studying more, perhaps a certain idea, seeing its pros and cons. They're very into planning and having contingency plans. And again, a churn. And that churn can sometimes hold the government back and not take bold moves, certainly in foreign policy. But it's also, it allows them to be very careful and very methodical and surgical in their foreign policy.

Do I take away from that, that Republicans have more fun?

Republicans do have more fun. Sorry, they do have more fun. They do have more fun. I will say, say that they are. That Republicans tend to more move fast and break things and sometimes that can work. But it's also going to have its consequences that might not be planned for on the Democrat side. They are much more careful and meticulous. And the problem with that is inherently, by the way, and I should have mentioned this too, is that Republicans do tend to have a view of the United States in a supreme way, that the US is leader of the free world, that there is a role that comes with that and that kind of an American supremacy to it. Democrats don't like that at all. They are much more careful. They don't want to be seen as the bully. They don't want to be seen as bossing countries around. And I understand that in a lot of ways, but when that comes to dealing with adversaries, that doesn't work so well. It's great. Allies.

Well, the Democrats prefer to export morality much more than the Republicans. Hagar, 10 years from now, where do you see the Middle East? What's the best case scenario 10 years from now?

I definitely see an expansion of the Abraham Accords, more countries that have made peace with Israel and as a result, more thriving economies and developed economies because of it in areas like Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, even, by the way, Iraq is shifting before our eyes, Lebanon, of course, as I mentioned. But also I really see that I would see that Gulf countries that have always viewed their area as a bastion of stability, that balloon has been punctured and they're going to want assurances from the United States and from others that they're going to be secure because that is critical to their economy. And so I see a form of like a NATO for the Middle East where you have and by the way, the beauty of a NATO of the Middle East, where you have those alliances and a defense pact like that is, is not just that everybody comes to the defense of the other, but that that could over time decrease American presence, military presence in the region, because you could place, for example, missiles there and you'll have armies that you're allied with and whom you've trained. And so I see something like that, hopefully the end of the Iranian regime as well, but we don't know when that'll happen.

As they say in the Middle East. Inshallah.

Inshallah.

Inshallah. Hagar, thank you so much for being here. This has been a terrific conversation and I have been looking forward to meeting you. I know you've got a YouTube show called Oh My World. It's not a soap opera. Tune it in because you're going to learn an awful lot and have fun while doing it.

Thank you so much. I so appreciate it.

Thank you.

Power, Propaganda, and a Reshaped Middle East

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